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Introduction
This paper studies the impact of labor supply shocks on labor market outcomes. Despite clear theoretical predictions, numerous empirical papers trying to estimate the e¤ects of labor supply shocks on wages have yielded di¤erent, and at times, contradictory results (Borjas, 2003) . In September 2000, as a consequence of the second Palestinian uprising, the borders between Israel and the West Bank were closed, preventing Palestinian workers from commuting to their jobs in Israel. The closure of the borders did not generate an immediate, one time, increase in the local labor supply because Palestinian workers expected to return to their jobs in Israel. Instead, as the political instability persisted, workers gave up their expectations of returning to work in Israel, and the local labor supply increased gradually.
By 2004 the share of Palestinians commuting to work in Israel had decreased by more than …fty percent, generating a large increase in the supply of workers competing for local jobs in the West Bank. 1 Aside from restricting mobility into Israel, the security measures imposed by Israel since September 2000 severely restricted the mobility of Palestinians between West Bank cities.
Consequently, the once homogenous West Bank region was divided into separate local labor markets, in which the mobility of both workers and products was limited. 2 As a result, I argue and provide evidence that labor supply shocks would have been absorbed locally because most past-migrants had to compete over jobs in their original locality of residence.
This allows me to take advantage of quarterly variation in local labor supply across cities and over time generated by this unique natural experiment to provide additional evidence 1 Unlike other studies in the immigration literature, the paper studies the impact of past-commuters, who for political reasons could not travel anymore, on the wages in the source country. This analysis is relevant to current debates regarding immigration in developed countries and o¤ers an insight into how labor markets in developing countries might respond to the return of large numbers of workers. 2 According to weekly reports of the U.N. O¢ ce for the Coordination of Human A¤airs in the occupied Territories restrictions on mobility between Palestinian cities in the West Bank were often imposed on incoming and outgoing goods, a¤ecting the trade and transfer of products between the di¤erent regions.
on the short-run e¤ects of large in ‡ows of workers on labor market outcomes. 3;4 The analysis presented in this paper relies on a skill-speci…c measure of local labor supply to estimate the e¤ects of supply shocks on the wages and unemployment of each skill group. This measure calculates the share of the employed locally and the unemployed from the entire working force, which includes workers usually reporting to work in Israel.
Workers who report Israel as their work location can be currently employed in Israel or unemployed but expect to return. Thus, this measure incorporates the expectations of Palestinian workers about their chances of returning back to Israel. 5 The main identifying assumption is that variation in the number of workers from each city reporting Israel as their usual place of work varies over time for reasons that are uncorrelated with economic conditions at the city-level, and are determined by Israeli security measures. Of course, one could expect that the decline in economic activity due to political instability might also vary quarterly across di¤erent cities and be correlated with the quarterly measure of labor supply attenuating the causal e¤ects of labor supply shocks on wages. To deal with this issue, I include in the regressions city-speci…c measures of political instability to capture any remaining di¤erences in the demand shocks across cities, along with a time trend to capture demand shocks a¤ecting the entire region, and city …xed e¤ects to capture time-invariant characteristics of each city. I also provide some instrumental variable results and conduct a robustness check to con…rm my …ndings.
The most conservative results in the paper suggest that a 10 percent increase in the supply of low-skilled workers reduces low-skilled wages by about 1 percent. Interestingly, an increase of 10 percent in the supply of high-skilled workers also reduces low-skilled wages by about 1.5-2 percent. This suggests that high-skilled workers who could not commute to Israel anymore competed for low-skilled jobs, pushing the low skilled into unemployment. This hypothesis is con…rmed by estimating the e¤ect of labor supply on low-skilled unemployment rates. I …nd that an increase in the number of low-and highskilled workers who report Israel as their usual work location reduces the unemployment rate among the low skilled. As for the high-skilled workers, the results suggest that an increase in their own labor supply decreases their wages slightly, but these e¤ects are not as precisely estimated. An increase in the low-skilled labor supply has no e¤ect on high-skilled wages. The wage results are consistent with the e¤ects on the unemployment rates of high-skilled workers. Di¤erences in the e¤ects across skill groups also suggest that the estimates are not picking up demand related factors or direct e¤ects of the political instability which, as previous research has shown, have impacted all workers (Miaari and Sauer, 2006) .
The second section of the paper outlines the most notable events in the PalestinianIsraeli con ‡ict since 1967 and their economic relations. The third section discusses the data. The identi…cation strategy and the results are presented in the fourth section. I conclude and discuss the results in the …fth section.
Background
After the Israeli occupation of the West Bank of the Jordan River and the Gaza Strip in 1967, a large proportion of Palestinian workers commuted to Israel on a daily basis, mainly to supply labor services in the construction, manufacturing, and agriculture industries. By 1982, 48 percent of the men aged 18-64 in Gaza and 36 percent in the West Bank were employed in Israel (Angrist, 1996) . During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the ‡ow of Palestinian labor to Israel ‡uctuated in response to major political events such as the …rst Palestinian uprising (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) Along with changes in the border policies toward foreign non-Palestinian workers (which aimed to lower the demand for Palestinian labor), Israel responded to Palestinian attacks and local disruptions by enacting a number of policies that a¤ected Palestinian mobility in 6 The 1993-1997 period is also characterized by a reduction in the number of Palestinians commuting to Israel that might have had an e¤ect on domestic wages and employment. It is not analyzed in this paper because the disruptions to the supply of labor were temporary so that workers expected to return to the Israeli market and thus not creating a permanent supply shock in the Palestinian market. 7 Notice in Figure 1 that the share of employed Palestinians in Israel declines sharply in September of 2000, as the borders closed. However, the sharp increase in the local labor supply, depicted in Figures  2a and 2b , did not occur until the third quarter of 2001. This re ‡ects the di¤erence between actual employment and the adjustment of expectations about work location.
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and into Israel. These policies included: a reduction in the number of work permits issued to Palestinians, a change of group permits (based on age and marital status) to individual permits, curfews imposed on Palestinian cities, external and internal closures, and, …nally, in 2002 Israel began to build a separation barrier. 8 Several studies have considered the Israeli-Palestinian labor markets. Angrist (1996) used quarterly time-series on person-days under curfew in the West Bank and Gaza as an exogenous supply shock to identify the e¤ects on wages paid to Palestinians employed in Israel. His analysis utilized data from 1981-1991. This study, in contrast, is primarily interested in the response of Palestinian wages in the local labor market, uses a di¤erent data set, and employs a di¤erent identi…cation strategy.
More recent studies have attempted to estimate the cost of the political con ‡ict on the labor market Friedberg and Sauer, 2004) . Speci…cally, Miaari and Sauer Historically, the supply of Palestinian workers to Israel was never stable; from time 10 In 1995, the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) was established, and the …rst labor force survey was conducted in the third quarter of 1995. Previous studies on the Palestinian labor market used the Territories Labor Force Survey (TLFS). This survey was conducted by local enumerators employed by the Israeli Civil Administration in the Occupied Territories. 11 The PLFS data set is especially attractive because it was collected by Palestinian enumerators. Hence, measurement errors due to misreporting, especially for variables related to working in Israel, are expected to decrease. Despite periods of severe restrictions on mobility, the survey was conducted with very few interruptions, mainly because local enumerators were employed in di¤erent cities so that restrictions on mobility between cities in the West Bank did not a¤ect the collection of the data. This said, the sample size collected during 2002-2004 is slightly smaller in size than previous years. I adjust for these di¤erences by weighting the sample to represent the entire population in the West Bank. 12 The labor force participation rate (not reported in Table 1 ) increased slightly from 18 to 24 percent between 2000 and 2004. 13 The sample size is smaller Table 1 ).
Descriptive Statistics
The question about work location is asked with regard to current or usual job. Usual commuters who were unemployed at the time of the survey could still report Israel as their work location, while other unemployed workers did not report a work location. Thus, the work location variable incorporates information about both current location and expectations about work location. This is re ‡ected in the high proportion of unemployed workers 
Composition E¤ects
A common problem in the immigration literature is that the observed reduction in wages might be a result of a "composition" e¤ect (Friedberg, 1995) . The idea is that the observed city-level mean wages are composed of the wages of natives and of the new immigrants.
Therefore, if immigrants earn less than natives (for example because of skill di¤erences), then the average wage in cities with higher proportions of immigrants will be lower even if immigrants have no adverse impact on the wages of natives.
Since individuals who were employed in Israel in the past (and are not anymore) cannot be identi…ed, decomposing the wages between past commuters and non-commuters is not possible. However, we can use changes in observable determinants of wages (such as education, and age) to address the likely impact of composition changes on local average wages. As shown in Table 1 , the distribution of skills (education and age) over time among works employed in the West Bank, workers who usually commute to Israel, and the unemployed seems to be remarkably stable across the three populations given the large changes in shares. The average characteristics of workers who usually commute to
Israel hardly moves despite their numbers being cut by more than half, and the average characteristics of the unemployed did not change much despite their numbers more than doubling. There is a slight increase in the mean years of education and age of workers employed in the West Bank. It might indicate that the most skilled workers among pastcommuters replaced unskilled workers in the local labor market, while driving unskilled workers into unemployment.
To further explore the potential impact of composition changes, I estimate the following wage equation conditional on demographic characteristics separately for the years 2000-2004 restricting the samples to include only workers employed in the West Bank:
In (1) t iq is a dummy variable indicating whether person i is observed in quarter q, a is is a dummy that indicates if i is in education group s, b ic is a dummy that indicates if i is in age group c, g id is a dummy for industry d, m i is a marital status dummy, and r i indicates whether i lives in a refugee camp. 15 After obtaining the estimates I decompose the decline in average wages between the year 2000 and each of the years that follow using the Oaxaca method, Oaxaca (1973) . This decomposition helps in determining which percentage of the decline in average wages is due to changes in the average characteristics and which is due to changes in the coe¢ cients.
The results of the decomposition are in line with the raw data in Table 1 . 
Mobility between Cities in the West Bank
The Israeli restrictions on Palestinian mobility to Israel were accompanied by restrictions on the movement of Palestinians between cities in the West Bank. These restrictions, in 15 The education groups indexed by s are 9-11, 12, 13-15 years, and 16 or more years. The age groups indexed by c are 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64. The industries indexed by d are agriculture, manufacturing, construction, commerce, hotels and restaurants, and services. The omitted industry group is transport and communication. 16 The results of the decomposition are not reported and can be provided from the author upon request.
the form of road blocks and check points, increased dramatically the traveling time between relatively close cities. Moreover, the cost of daily commuting between cities in the West Bank also increased because short and direct routes that pass through Israel were blocked to Palestinians. Instead, Palestinians have to take much longer countryside roads which in some instances more that triple regular traveling time. 17 As a result, it is likely that most workers who could not travel to Israel anymore would have had to look for jobs in their city of residence, and as a consequence, the labor supply shocks would have been absorbed locally. Thus, in the analysis I assume that past-commuters who could not work in Israel anymore looked for jobs in their city of residence because they were unable to commute to another city. But how e¤ective were these restrictions in practice? There is, for example, had decreased back to 10 percent. 18 One needs to be cautious in the interpretation of the 17 The Israeli and International press provide ample evidence about the increase in the commuting time between relatively close cities in the West Bank. For example, Bethlehem and Ramallah are 20 miles apart with a direct commuting time of about 30 minutes. Due to mobility restrictions, Palestians have to take alternative routes that increase the travel time to at least 2 hours. 18 These …gures are based on aggregate analysis of the data. I repeated the same analysis using data from each city individually. There are no signi…cant di¤erences between the aggregate and the city-level …gures. 
Within City Variations
As mentioned in previous sections, the source of the increase in the Palestinian labor supply is the decrease in the number of workers who are able to commute to Israel. Formally, individuals in the sample are categorized into one of three exhaustive and mutually exclusive categories: employed locally, usually work in Israel, and unemployed who do not report a current or usual work location. 20 Since the data does not allow me to measure the absolute size of the labor force in each city, the labor supply measure is calculated as the share of the employed locally and the unemployed from the entire working force. Taking the natural logarithm, it can be expressed as follows:
19 The net migration rates reported in the CIA factbook are high, especially because the sample period is characterized by high levels of political instability. Even if these …gures are biased upwards, it is unlikely that a large ‡ow of emigration was taking place. 20 Employed individuals who did not report a workplace locations were dropped out of the sample. Over where D jcqt is the number of workers employed locally (of skill j, in city c, quarter q, and year t), U jcqt is the number of unemployed men who did not report a work location, and I jcqt is the number of workers who reported Israel as their usual work location. In this approach, workers prohibited from employment in Israel are assumed to be "pushed" into either employment or unemployment in their local labor market. 21 Therefore L measures within-city variation in the log labor supply over time. This allows me to use quarterly variation in the labor supply at the city level and over time to identify the e¤ects on wages and unemployment. 22 The identifying assumption is that the change in the number of workers reporting Israel as their work location from each city varies over time for reasons that are uncorrelated with the underlying or current city-speci…c economic conditions, but are only determined by Israeli security measures based, partially, on the level of political unrest. 23 This can be a concern if political unrest and local violent disruptions that varied quarterly across cities impacted wages directly. In this case, areas that were most a¤ected by Israeli sanctions 21 Provided that the population in each city is constant over the time period I analyze, or that the population in each city grows at the same rate, including city and year …xed e¤ects will capture the term ln[D jcqt + U jcqt + I jcqt ]: 22 The analysis in this paper excludes non-participants from the sample and from the labor supply measure. However, since the closure of the borders might a¤ect the participation decision of Palestinian men (e.g. via a "discouraged-worker" e¤ect), I include in unreported speci…cations non-participants in both terms of equation (2) . This allows me to endogenize the participation decision. This alternative measure of labor supply does not a¤ect my results in any signi…cant way. 23 There is substantial negative correlation between the number of workers employed in Israel and the number of fatalities. The correlation is around -0.42, and -0.30 for the low and high skilled, respectively. might also have experienced a larger overall decline in economic activity. To the extent that this was true, my estimates will be upward biased. To deal with this concern, I explicitly control for measures of political instability that vary by city and over time in 
where w icqt is the natural logarithm of real daily wages for individual i who lives in city c W , corresponding to each cell (5 year*4 quarters*10 cities=200), and is an error term.
I estimate this regression separately for 2 broadly de…ned skill groups: The …rst includes workers with less than 12 years of education (i.e., low skilled) and the second includes workers with 12 or more years of education (i.e., high skilled). 24 The estimated coe¢ cients of the …xed e¤ects,Ŵ , represent average wages for each skill group in every city, quarter, and year net of individual-varying characteristics. The estimated coe¢ cients on the …xed e¤ects then become the dependent variable in a regression that estimates the e¤ect of an increase in a quarterly measure of labor supply at the city level on average wages in each city. 25 Formally, the second step is to estimate the following regression:
whereŴ is the skill-speci…c average wage at the city-quarter-year level, which is equal to the estimated …xed e¤ects in equation (3), U L is the natural logarithm of a measure of the low-skilled labor supply (as de…ned in equation 2) and SL is the natural logarithm of a measure of the high-skilled labor supply. The e¤ect of the increase in the labor supply of low-skilled workers on (low or high skilled) wages is captured by 1 = dŴ =dU L and the e¤ect of the increase in the labor supply of high-skilled workers on wages is captured 24 Unskilled workers are de…ned as men with less than 12 years of education. Alternatively, I de…ne them as those with schooling years that are less than the mean plus one half of the standard deviation of years of schooling for a year-of-birth cohort. For example, workers who were born before 1944 are considered unskilled if they have 9 years of education or less. However, unskilled workers that were born after 1955 are de…ned as unskilled if they have less than 12 years of education. Both de…nitions yield similar results and I choose to work with the …rst for simplicity. 25 Donald and Lang (2007) show that if the group errors are independent then the two-step estimator is e¢ cient. Moreover, with a large number of groups (200 in my case) the t-statistics resulting from the two-step estimation should have very close to a normal distribution. A large number of observations per cluster reduces concerns about heteroskedasticity. In the sample I use, about 70 percent of the clusters have more than 200 observations. by 2 = dŴ =dSL. This speci…cation allows the estimation of the own-and cross-wage elasticities. The vector Z includes instability measures that vary across cities and over time, such as the number of Palestinians killed by the Israeli security forces and the number of days under curfew to control for city-speci…c e¤ects of political instability. I also include a set of city …xed e¤ects, C, to capture time-invariant city characteristics, year …xed e¤ects, T , to capture long term trends and common shocks to the West Bank, and quarter …xed e¤ects, Q, to capture seasonality. " is an error term. 26;27 Before I present the results of the estimation, it is useful to depict the variation in the domestic labor supply across cities and their relation to the political instability within those cities. Table 2 presents annual …gures for the number of Palestinians killed by the Israeli army in ten di¤erent cities ranked in descending order. 28 For example, the city of Figure 2b ) compared to cities with 26 The two-step estimator proposed by Donald and Lang (2007) does not address possible serial correlation in the city-level idiosyncratic terms over time. I tested for serial correlation in panel data using the method proposed by Wooldridge (2002) . The test for both the low-and high-skilled wage speci…cations has a p-value of about 0.13 and 0.15, respectively. Thus, I cannot reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. Similar results are found for the unemployment speci…cations. 27 Even if I cannot reject the hypothesis of no serial correlation in the panel, we might still worry about the estimated standard errors. Clustering is not a good option since there are only 10 cities in the data. Despite this, clustering the standard errors at the city-level produces slightly larger, but mostly similar, standard errors than the Huber-White standard errors I report in the paper. 28 In practice, fatalities vary also by quarter. I include in Table 4 only the annual …gures. 
Wage E¤ects
Panel A of Table 3 , presents the results of estimating equation (4) problem. Despite the fact that the standard errors increase substantially, it is encouraging that the signs of the coe¢ cients do not change and that the size of the coe¢ cient on the high-skilled labor supply remains large. Moreover, a joint F-test rejects the hypothesis that the coe¢ cients are jointly equal to zero. Including the high-skilled labor supply on its own in the regression (without the own elasticity) in column 3 indicates that a 10 percent increase in the high-skilled labor supply reduces low-skilled wages by about 2.1 percent, signi…cant at the 5 percent level. These results suggest that high-skilled workers might compete for low skilled jobs causing a decline in the wages of low-skilled workers.
Since we might still suspect that the local supply measure is endogenous, the identifying assumption suggests that we can use the log of the number of individuals who usually work in Israel, I, from each city as an instrument for the labor supply measure. 29 Similarly, the log of the number of unskilled and skilled individuals who usually work in Israel (U I and SI, respectively) can be used to instrument the low-and high-skilled labor supply. The correlation between the number of individuals who usually work in Israel from each city and the measure of labor supply in each city is negative, strong, and highly signi…cant with an F-test of about 94. The correlations between the number of low-and high-skilled individuals who usually work in Israel and the skill-speci…c labor supply measures are also negative and highly signi…cant with F-tests that are at least above 50. 30 Panel B of Table   3 presents the reduced form results -the e¤ects of changes in the number of individuals 29 Endogeneity in the labor supply measure (equation 2) can occur because some of the employed or unemployed drop out of the labor force or emigrate. Instrumenting the local labor supply with the number of individuals who usually work in Israel takes advantage only of the exogenous variation in the local labor supply generated by restrictions on mobility to Israel. The validity of this instrument is threatened if some of the workers who usually worked in Israel drop out of the labor force or emigrate. 30 The …rst-stage results are not presented in the paper but can be provided from the author upon request. Table 4 includes the results of estimating equation (4) using high-skilled wages as the dependent variable. Unlike the results in Table 3 , the coe¢ cients on the di¤erent labor supply measures are small and statistically insigni…cant. The coe¢ cient on the high-skilled labor supply in column 2 is about -0.0462 and maintains the same magnitude with or without including the labor supply of the low skilled, which enters the regression with a very small coe¢ cient and large standard error. These results suggest that high-skilled workers who could not migrate to Israel competed for low-skilled jobs in the West Bank. This is not entirely surprising because, despite the higher skills of these workers, jobs in Israel were mainly concentrated in traditionally low-skilled industries such as construction and agriculture. The di¤erence in the e¤ects on the low-and high-skilled workers also suggest that the coe¢ cients are not picking up the direct e¤ects of political instability which likely a¤ected, at least to some degree, the wages of all workers regardless of their skill level.
The IV results for the high skilled are also in line with results reported in Panel A of Table 4 , but with one exception. The coe¢ cient on the high-skilled labor supply in column 2 is larger (-0.0924) and statistically signi…cant at the 5 percent level. Including the low-skilled measure in the regression increases the coe¢ cient even more (in absolute value), to -0.1773, and remains signi…cant at the 10 percent level. These results suggest that an increase in the labor supply of the high skilled reduces their wages, but an increase in the supply of the low skilled does not impact high-skilled wages.
31
It is also useful to pay some attention to the instability measures included in the regressions. Their inclusion is supposed to capture direct e¤ects of city-level political instability on wages. For low-skilled wages, the coe¢ cient on the number of fatalities (not presented in the Table) is small and statistically insigni…cant while the e¤ect of days under curfew is negative and signi…cant at least at the 10 percent level. Excluding fatalities and days under curfew from the analysis hardly changes the results. This might be occurring because fatalities had little immediate e¤ect on wages after controlling for year and quarter …xed e¤ects. In fact, the raw correlation between fatalities (or curfews) and local labor supply is reduced signi…cantly once time e¤ects are taken into account.
One scenario which is consistent with the wage results is that while low-skilled workers compete mainly for low-skilled jobs, high-skilled workers compete over both low-and highskilled jobs. With no growth in the demand for labor, this might also suggest that an increase in the supply of low-skilled workers will increase the unemployment rate of the low skilled but will have no e¤ect on the unemployment rate of the high skilled. Conversely, an increase in the supply of high-skilled workers should increase the unemployment rate of both the low-and the high-skilled workers since they compete for jobs in both markets. 31 Since changes in expectations of returning to Israel might also be endogenous, I also experimented by using the number of workers employed in Israel from each city as an instrument. That is, I exclude all workers that are unemployed but continue to report Israel as their work location from the instrument. The results of this experiment repeats the general results reported in the paper, but with slightly bigger magnitudes for the low skilled. These results can be provided upon request.
The next section tests these hypotheses formally.
Unemployment E¤ects
As in the wage analysis, I start by estimating an individual-level regression where I regress an indicator for unemployment (takes 1 if unemployed and 0 if employed, regardless of work location) on individual varying characteristics such as age, education and marital status, and a full set of city-year-quarter …xed e¤ects. I estimate these regressions separately by skill group and obtain a set of city-year-quarter unemployment rates net of individual e¤ects. I then use the estimated coe¢ cients on the …xed e¤ects as my dependent variable to investigate the relationship between the increase in the labor supply and unemployment.
However, using the measure of the labor supply in equation (2) Table 5 includes the results on the unemployment rate of low-skilled workers.
Column 1 suggests that a 10 percent increase in the number of individuals usually working in Israel (I, with no skill distinction) reduces the low-skilled unemployment rate by about 0.6 percentage points, signi…cant at the 1 percent level. Similarly, the coe¢ cient on the number of low-skilled workers who report Israel as their work location (U I) in column 2 suggests a negative association between the two variables. This is consistent with the results on wages where an increase in the low-skilled labor supply reduced the wages of the low skilled. Including the number of high-skilled individuals who usually work in Israel (SL) in the regression reduces the magnitude of the e¤ect but it remains signi…cant at the 10 percent level. The coe¢ cient on the high skilled also enters the regression with a negative sign but it is not statistically signi…cant (in column 4), probably because of multicollinearity.
32 These …ndings support the argument that high-skilled workers compete for both low-and high-skilled jobs, pushing some of the low skilled into unemployment.
Panel B of Table 5 repeats the analysis using the high-skilled unemployment rates as the dependent variable. Consistent with the wage results, the e¤ects on unemployment are smaller compared to the e¤ects on the low-skilled unemployment rates. The coe¢ cient in Column 2, for example, suggests that a 10 percent increase in the number of high-skilled workers from each city who report Israel as their usual work location reduces the highskilled unemployment rate by about 0.1 percentage points, consistent with the negative e¤ects of an increase in the high-skilled labor supply on their own wages. As expected, however, the relationship between the number of low-skilled individuals who usually work in
Israel and the unemployment rate of the high skilled is small and statistically insigni…cant (column 3 and 4). This is consistent with the scenario that low-skilled workers do not compete for high skilled jobs. 
Robustness Check
The main identifying assumption in the paper is that the number of workers who usually work in Israel varies across cities and over time for reasons that are uncorrelated with the underlying economic conditions in each city and are mostly determined by the Israeli security forces based on the level of local unrest. Since political unrest can have direct 32 Excluding fatalities and days under curfew does not change the results signi…cantly both for the skilled and unskilled workers. 33 Evidence for occupational downgrading among the high skilled workers would also be consistent with the scenario of high skilled workers competing over low skilled jobs. The PLFS classi…es workers into seven broadly de…ned groups. Indeed, in the year 2000, 37 percent of the high skilled report to work in "elementary occupation". This number increases to 52 percent by 2003. Most of the change in the occupational distribution comes from a reduction of high skilled workers reporting to be "craft and trade workers". impact on wages, not controlling adequately for these city-speci…c factors will bias my estimates upwards. It is reasonable to think, however, that cities with low fatalities and days under curfews are also likely to have su¤ered less from unobserved demand-shifts related to the political unrest. Thus, replicating the …ndings using only data from these cities should increase the con…dence in the …ndings I report in Tables 3 and 4 . Table 6 reports the results of the wage e¤ects when the sample is restricted to include the four cities with the lowest numbers of fatalities (last four in Table 2) . Surprisingly, the results for the low skilled (Panel A) are slightly larger than the results reported in Table 3 This experiment suggests that the results in Tables 3 and 4 are not merely driven by demand-related factors.
Conclusion and Discussion
This paper analyzes the adjustment of labor markets to large in ‡ows of workers. It contributes to the existing literature in several ways. The availability of quarterly data allows the investigation of short-term response dynamics of markets to large increases of labor supply. This is in contrast to most studies on the e¤ects of immigration that use decennial or yearly data (Borjas, 2003; Card, 1990) . Another unique feature comes from the fact that, because of security measures, the West Bank was segmented into closed labor markets, with positive but limited mobility across cities. As a result, the empirical strategy I employ is arguably not contaminated by a severe native out-migration problem common in the literature. Finally, in contrast to other recent studies of the Palestinian labor market, 34 The results on unemployment when the sample is restricted to politically stable cities are in line with the results in Table 5 , and consistent with the …ndings on the wage e¤ects.
I try to disentangle the e¤ects of the labor supply shocks on wages and employment from the e¤ects of the political con ‡ict on the Palestinian labor market. This distinction may be useful when evaluating future border policies between the two nations.
The results reveal an interesting adjustment dynamics of the low-and high-skilled labor markets. I …nd that an increase of 10 percent in the supply of low-and high-skilled workers reduces the wages of the low-skilled workers by about 1-2 percent. Consistent with the wage results, I …nd that an increase in the number of low-and high-skilled workers who usually work in Israel reduces the unemployment rate of low-skilled workers.
The wages of high-skilled workers, on the other hand, seem to respond mostly to increases in their own labor supply, although these results are not as precisely estimated.
The e¤ect of an increase in the low-skilled labor supply on high-skilled wages is small and statistically insigni…cant across speci…cations. I also …nd that an increase in the number of high-skilled individuals who usually work in Israel reduces the high-skilled unemployment rates. In contrast, an increase in number of low-skilled individuals who usually work in Israel has no e¤ect on the high-skilled unemployment rates. The wage and unemployment results for the low-and high-skilled workers are consistent with a scenario in which highskilled workers compete for low-and high-skilled jobs, pushing low-skilled workers into unemployment.
Despite the uniqueness of the Palestinian experience, this paper sheds light on the effects of work migrants returning to their home country and the e¤ect of a large labor supply shock on labor markets in developing countries. This might be of particular importance to debates about immigration policies and their e¤ects on both hosting and source countries. Nablus  30  54  170  58  74  386  Jenin  21  45  151  46  43  306  Ramallah  27  38  77  14  12  168  Hebron  20  38  67  27  15  167  Tulkarem  13  24  64  36  29  166  Bethlehem 14  34  48  10  4  110  Qalqilya  6  10  18  8  6  48  Tubas  0  9  22  6  1  38  Sal…t  3  11  3  1  2  20  Jericho  7  1  3  2  3  16 U L and SL are the log of unskilled and skilled labor supply, respectively. I is the log of the number of workers in Israel with no skill distinction. U I and SI are the log of the number of unskilled and skilled workers in Israel. R-squared is about 0.75 in all speci…cations. See Table 3 for de…nitions and list of controls. R-squared is about 0.66 in all speci…cations. Table 3 for de…nitions and list of controls. R-squared is about 0.67 and 0.56 for the low and high-skill speci…cations, respectively. Table 3 for de…nitions and list of controls. R-squared is about 0.73 and 0.61 for the low and high-skill speci…cations, respectively. Sample size is 80.
